quespeedewtiper.ml/fixin-tapeo-del.php Legal and psychological reconstruction including the regulation of war crimes, war damages, looted or illegally acquired property and reconciliation. According to Western conceptions of post-conflict, peace-building also includes the accomplishment of the rule of law, social justice, political par- ticipation, and a constructive non-violent conflict culture and the control of emotions and instincts Senghaas , This peace-building sequence may sound self-contradictory. Indeed, for there to be negative peace, incentives and rewards for the war constituency are needed.
Yet, positive peace demands the prosecution of war criminals and the regulation of open questions concerning property. As long as violence- actors face the threat of prosecution they will not agree to peace. There is a sense in which, therefore, the demands of a negative peace together with the necessary rewards for the fighters would lead to a situation in which violence would pay, after all.
However, with- out their support and agreement a negotiated peace will not be possible. The victor may, and often does, dictate the peaceful order. Usually, war crimes are prosecuted and open questions concerning property are set- tled, and even reconciliation may be initiated. However, the defeated party mostly will be pursued legally. Successful peace-building is based on core conditions that are not easy to meet. Peace-building requires: 1 Recognisable conflict- ing parties with military and political leaders that can negotiate and imple- ment peace control military actions and sufficient command power ; 2 leaders who are motivated to negotiate a peace-agreement that considers the specific security, political and economic interests of the opponents; 3 lead- ers and fighters who will accept post-conflict governance arrangements, including a monopoly of violence not controlled by themselves.
The chances of finding these conditions for peace-building vary according to the type of conflict. In bi-polar centralized conflicts, the core conditions may be established if the leaders are ready for real peace-negotiations. In decentralised multi-polar conflicts, peace-building is much more complicated. In cases of war- lordism this motivation is lacking. Without linkages to the people, the main issue becomes the interests of leaders and fighters.
The risk is that, after a peace agreement, unsatisfied fighters may split away and continue the conflict. In any case, a peaceful order with a monopoly of violence will rarely be implemented only by agreement; it has to be enforced.
Conclusion: The rebels who did not lose the war, but lost the peace Elas sempre eram sustentadas pelo marido ou arranjavam um marido para que pudesse administrar o seu dinheiro. Manuel Ferreira. But they were very bad. But what is the source of their wealth? The argument is misleading.
The creation of a peaceful order is not only a question of negotiated peace but of the exis- tence or creation of a power that is able to keep the monopoly of violence in a defined territory. In a nutshell, a peaceful order goes hand-in-hand with the establishment or the reassertion of a central state power. The kind of peace- ful order will depend on the type of state and its political rule. A classical civil war? The dynamics of armed violence In this section we start by attempting to classify the Mozambican conflict in terms of our analytical framework. We make a distinction between mediation as a formal process and mediation as a substantive process.
The latter refers to the issues that are the subject of negotiation. This distinction is cru- cial to understanding the kind of peace that the Rome talks granted Mozambique. We shall explore the implications of the latter perspective by stressing two aspects of the negotia- tion process that were central to its success; the active bracketing-off of human rights issues and submission to the financial blackmail of the negotiating par- ties.
We shall conclude the section with a brief checklist of the criteria of pos- itive peace in order to draw attention to the fragility of the Rome peace. These descrip- tions reveal a normative pattern that appears to play a major role in the analy- sis of the conflict. Accounts of the war tend to distinguish between internal and external factors.
Authors who emphasise external factors are more likely to be sympathetic to the Marxist-oriented FRELIMO government that came to power at independence e. In the context of the external emphasis, two accounts have been dominant. First, there are those who see the conflict as part of the Cold War. In this sense, Mozambique may have been caught in a proxy war. Authors who give primacy to the internal factors have a tendency to play down regional and geo-strategic factors. Instead, they look into politics inside the country itself for an explanation of the war e.
In terms of these accounts, therefore, the war was a more or less legitimate act of resistance — by political opponents of the regime or by a disaffected rural population — against an illegitimate state power. There is perhaps a third type of description. It gives equal weight to internal and external factors, but rather than seeking to account for the war in normative terms it stresses the devastating effects of the conflict on the country as a whole.
Our aim in this paper is not to explain the war. Rather, we wish to focus on the dynamics of violence. There is a sense in which the Mozambican con- flict could be described as a centralised bi-polar war. Indeed, the war opposed a government army fighting a conventional war to a rebel army employing guerrilla tactics. The government army relied on state resources for conscription, training and financing. Its officers and soldiers were trained both in the country and abroad. Training in the country itself was undertaken mostly by Tanzanian, Soviet Russian and North Korean instructors.
A considerable number of offi- cers enjoyed training abroad in such diverse countries as Libya, East Germany, Cuba and the Soviet Union. In the later years of the war several contingents of Mozambican army officers were given training by British Special Forces in Zimbabwe. The army acquired its military hardware mostly from the Soviet Union, although the British army also supplied light weaponry in the later stages of the war.
As the rebels increasingly established themselves in Mozambique, especially in the central provinces, and became more daring in their military campaign, the army switched to an offensive strategy with frequent incursions against rebel strongholds. This strategy was combined with attempts at securing transport routes, economic infrastructure such as bridges, factories and electricity pylons, as well as providing protection to travellers and villagers in the countryside. The rebels evolved from an initial mercenary stage to a kind of guerrilla army supported by apartheid South Africa and Western right-wing groups with some sort of a political programme.
They blended elements of a fairly well organised warlord structure that supported the war effort with looting, forced labour and poaching. A significant source of revenue from the mid- eighties onwards was protection money. They were able to extract this from the British multinational Lonrho as well as from Malawi.
They were created by the Southern Rhodesian secret service towards the end of the seventies to counter the activities of Zanu-PF in Mozambique and to undermine the sup- port given to the former by the latter. With majority rule in Zimbabwe in , they moved their bases to Mozambique. Training and mili- tary supply were taken over by the South African Army Intelligence Services, which would remain loyal to the rebels throughout the conflict, even after the signing of a non-aggression pact between Mozambique and South Africa Stiff In the early years of the conflict the rebels avoided engaging the army directly.
They aimed their activities at economic infrastructure and car- ried out raids and terrorist acts against the civilian population. During these raids and attacks on the civilian population, the rebels conscripted fighters into their ranks and procured food and consumer goods. The latter, together with ivory from felled elephants and different types of hides, would be exchanged for other consumer goods as well as for weaponry through an intricate trading system involving middlemen in Malawi and South Africa Vines They had been able to spread their activities to the whole of the coun- try, severely undermining economic activity in the countryside and curtailing the movement of people between cities.
Contrary, however, to overly roman- ticised accounts of an efficient guerrilla force of highly motivated and well- trained fighters enjoying the support of the rural population against a demor- alised, under-equipped and inefficient government army e. In other words, the rebels were successful in that the government army was unable to defeat them militarily.
They relied on a well-articulated military structure for details see Geffray ; Gersony ; Hoile ; Vines In spite of their military strength, the rebels never controlled territory. Some authors suggest that this simply did not fit into their military philosophy, which relied heavily on mobile and flex- ible fighting units Geffray ; Vines Other authors point to the lack of a coherent political project, which would have been necessary to rally the population behind the rebels.
The territory under the control of the rebels consisted of their strongholds and their respective perimeters. Civilians were an efficient human shield against government army air raids. In the months following the signing of the Nkomati Accord, the non- aggression pact between South Africa and Mozambique in , the govern- ment, aided by a much better equipped and trained Zimbabwean expedi- tionary force — with British SAS commandos — launched an all-out offensive against the main rebel strongholds in Central Mozambique.
Most of them were overrun, forcing the rebels to disperse and break into very small units. These campaigns dealt severe blows to the rebels without, however, seriously curtailing their military activities, which became even more brutal. The rebels, for their part, had had to give up their strongholds, but were able to reorganise and set forth their campaigns.
The politics of peace-building Towards the end of the eighties, it had become clear to many that neither party could win the war. A number of factors accounted for this. On the gov- ernments side, the war effort was sapping resources that were dearly needed elsewhere. There are estimates according to which it was costing Mozambique and Zimbabwe nearly a million dollars a day to keep the joint force. Donors were pressing for a negotiated solution to the conflict as a pre- condition for further structural adjustment funds and emergency relief.
In the eighties, the country found itself in the throes of a severe drought that claimed hundreds of thousands of lives and displaced around 4 million peo- ple. Internally, there were growing calls for a negotiated settlement. The drought was taking its toll on the traditional logistics of the guer- rilla fighting units, which could no longer rely on looting and forced labour for food procurement Flume ; Della Rocca ; Vines Previous attempts at ending the conflict peacefully had ended unsuccess- fully, apparently because they had failed to take the rebels seriously.
The earli- est attempt was made in the run-up to the Nkomati Accord, when the South African government arranged for the rebels to acknowledge the legitimacy of the Mozambican political order, including its head of state, Samora Machel, in exchange for amnesty and reintegration into Mozambican society. These plans never came into fruition owing to differences within the rebel movement, which at the time was locked into bloody internal conflict.
While many rank-and-file rebel fighters heeded the amnesty call, it had no significant impact on the leadership. Political liberalisation reached its climax in , when a new liberal demo- cratic constitution was passed following a broad consultation process. In their various attempts at formulating a political agenda, the rebels had often insisted on a liberal democratic political order as the aim of their struggle.
Confronted with this fait accompli, they had trouble justifying the war to the international community and this must have played a major role in predisposing them to a negotiated settlement. The Mozambican war was ripe for resolution Zartman The mili- tary options had become limited, risky and costly. Economic resources to fuel the war had become scarce, popular support had declined dramatically 10 and a sort of political platform that could serve as the basis for negotiation had come into existence. Cameron Hume, a deputy chief of the U.
His account describes the process and seeks to uncover the reasons for the success of the mediation. They were mediated by this lay Catholic community, building on initiatives to bring peace to the country undertaken by the churches in Mozambique dating back to the mid-eighties. Hume breaks the negotiating process into five conceptual parts. In the first part, which covered the first three rounds of talks between July and December , the negotiating process consisted of getting dialogue started.
The single most important issue that was discussed throughout the first three rounds was the status of the negotiating partners. As Hume points out, traditional diplomacy is mainly concerned with conflicts between states. The Mozambican conflict, however, opposed a state to an insurgent move- ment. Nonetheless, it was at pains to keep the facade of negotiating as a sovereign entity by consistently rejecting the involvement of the United Nations as a peace-broker.
The rebels, for their part, were inexperienced diplomatically and politically, had few resources to match those the government could muster for its negotiating team, and were highly suspicious. They were concerned with their personal security and wary about talking to the government directly. They insisted throughout on the presence of mediators who would ensure not only the good faith of the government but also fair negotiations. The second part spanned rounds four, five, six and seven between January and October It dealt with the nitty-gritty of the negotiating process.
A major issue at the time was the timing of discussion of political and military issues. Not only did it lay down the framework within which talks would proceed, but it also defined an agenda that would henceforth structure the process. The third part consisted of rounds eight and nine. Although little direct contact took place between the negotiating parties, agreement was reached on 12 March concerning the electoral law for the elections that would fol- low a cease-fire agreement.
For the first time since the start of talks in Rome, the government and the rebels negotiated directly with one another: the Mozambican head of state and the rebel leader met in private all night long to settle outstanding issues before signing, in August , a declaration committing themselves to peace and thanking the mediators for their role in bringing them together.
The final part of the peace talks consisted of rounds eleven and twelve. It worked out compromises on military issues, including the technical details concerning demobilisation, the formation of a new unified army and overall security for former rebels. This brief tour through the formal structure of the negotiating process as it took shape in Rome brings into bold relief what is actually involved in such procedures. Mediation, as Hume clearly shows, was crucial to bringing vio- lent conflict to manageable proportions through de-escalation.
All through the process mediators sought to bring the negotiating partners to set the con- ditions for negative peace, i. Negative peace is not an end in itself, but rather a step towards a higher goal, namely positive peace. In the Mozambican conflict the important preconditions for negotiating a negative peace had been met. There were recognisable political parties and identifiable military and political leaders ready and willing to negotiate for peace. As we have seen above, the Mozambican conflict developed into a clas- sical civil war opposing a state and a rebel guerrilla movement.
Furthermore, both parties displayed a coherent and well-structured hierarchy with leaders strong enough to impose themselves on their followers. On either side of the conflict there seemed to be enough motivation to pursue negotiations as the better alternative. To be sure, at times both parties seemed to misunderstand the whole process. As for the rebels, who did not seem to have any long-term objectives, the peace process was a highly effective way to secure political recognition internationally.
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The Italian ambassador to Mozambique at the time reports, for example, on a long and bitter conversation he had with the Mozambican President in which the latter castigated the mediators for seeming to take sides with the rebels. As mentioned above many peace settle- ments are less about political and ideological issues at the root of the conflict than they are about securing the position of military leaders and fighters in political, economic and legal terms. This holds true for Mozambique. Much of what Hume describes as starting the dialogue involved precisely helping the parties to define themselves in ways that would help them secure claims in a post-conflict order.
In the initial rounds of negotiations, the government was concerned to project the impression of being the representative of a mag- nanimous sovereign state stretching its hand to nationals gone astray. Indeed, the mediators were faced with a formidable task. There were three important sets of issues at play, namely the political, the diplomatic and the financial.
First, throughout the civil war the rebels had failed to develop a political profile and programme. The argument is misleading. It seems to suggest that the rebellion grew out of this dissatisfaction, when in fact the rebels came much later to articulate it as part of the things for which they were fighting. They commissioned a South- Africa-based German constitutional lawyer, Prof. Andre Thomashausen, to draft statutes for the movement as well as to write up a constitution for a post-conflict Mozambique.
On several occasions, the rebels approached some Western governments for support in political matters. In , the Italian government funded the first RENAMO congress ever Vines , a move calculated by the rebels to give its negotiating position more political weight. The money and effort that they invested in this was well spent.
Second, the rebels were internationally isolated. With the exceptions of South Africa, Kenya and Malawi, virtually no other country overtly sup- ported them. South Africa did it by virtue of its own pariah status at the time as well as due to the fact that it had taken control of the rebels after the demise of the white minority regime in Rhodesia. For successive American administrations, the Mozambican rebels were little more than terrorists, even at the height of anti-communist sentiment during the Reagan administra- tion.
Britain was also hostile to the rebels. The rebels saw the peace process as a welcome opportunity to break out of their international isolation. In the early rounds of the talks, they repeatedly raised the issue. At times, they would justify their reservations against certain Western countries on the grounds that they were biased towards the govern- ment. One particularly cunning strategy the rebels deployed to this end was the insistence that mediators and foreign dignitaries wishing to consult with the rebel leader do so in his stronghold in Mozambique.
As de-escalation set in, the rebels were faced with worsening logistical problems coupled with the rather exacting financial price attached to participation at the talks in Rome. Their negotiators had to travel and be lodged. Often they lacked such bare necessi- ties as pencils and notebooks, 13 not to mention technical equipment that would allow swift and reliable communication with the leadership in the Mozambican bush. Getting the rebels to the negotiating table also meant meeting their finan- cial needs. It is well known that the rebels made the sign- ing of the cease-fire agreement conditional upon payment.
Funds subsequently pledged by the Italian government never materi- alised as an angry rebel leader would reveal in at a press conference in Maputo Vines It was an exercise in pretence. The mediators pre- tended that they were dealing with an intact sovereign state on the one hand and a legitimate political opposition on the other hand. The fact that the peace negotiations themselves were proof that the Mozambican state was not as sovereign and as intact as it pretended to be was a necessary fiction for the success of mediation.
The same argument applies equally well to the rebels, whose inability to formulate a coherent political programme and obvious attempts at blackmailing their way into a post-conflict political order flew in the face of the aura of respectability attached to the Rome peace talks. It revolved around the tension between negative peace and positive peace. The purely technical aspects of positive peace did take place as planned. Demobilisation, for example, took place on schedule, even if ini- tially RENAMO only demobilised fighters from marginal areas such as Niassa and Inhambane.
In the run-up to the first elections in , there were numerous violent incidents, overall, involving former fighters. In one such incident a government minister along with other people was kid- napped and held hostage by former combatants. The formation of the national army took much longer than envisaged. In fact, contrary to what had been planned, no unified army was on the ground by the time elections were held in Technical reconstruction of destroyed infrastructure started even before the elections.
It was part of the national reconstruction programme that donors had committed themselves to financing once peace had been achieved. These have stressed its inappropriateness and insufficiency Hanlon ; and its problematic neo-liberal assumptions Abrahamsson and Nilsson Whatever the relative merits of the practice of development aid in Mozambique, it is obvious that structural adjustment has provided a frame- work for the management of reconstruction activities in the post-war period.
However, with the exception of the return of church property confiscated by the FRELIMO government during its revolutionary phase as well as the return of — or compensation for — nationalised property, not much else has happened on this score. Neither the government army nor the rebels have been held accountable for looted or illegally acquired property. While it is fair to assume that the Mozambican conflict was ripe for resolu- tion, available evidence suggests that the achievement of negative peace held important aspects of positive peace hostage to the negotiated settlement.
Two aspects are worthy of note, both affecting the government as much as the rebels. There seems to have been an assumption that successful mediation, mea- sured according to whether negative peace had been achieved, would have to bracket off human rights issues. Neither the government, nor the rebels, stood in a good light as far as these were concerned.
FRELIMO shares with other liberation movements a general contempt for the rights of individuals held to be opposed to its ideological goals. During the liberation war, executions of adversaries as well as violent purges seem to have taken place as a matter of routine Cabrita ; Chilcote When the political system was opened up in the early s, there were a few attempts, especially by the relatives of the victims, to reopen the files. These bore little fruit. Throughout the post-independence socialist experiment, FRELIMO had a tendency to treat human rights in a cavalier manner by subordinating basic human rights issues to the ideological goal of constructing a socialist society.
Corporal and capital punishment were reintroduced after having been abol- ished at independence. The Renamo rebels were even worse. They rank amongst the most bru- tal guerrilla movements Africa has ever seen. Their terrorist repertoire included the routine maiming of victims chillingly documented by Lina Magaia, a Mozambican journalist Magaia RENAMO directed its vio- lence principally against civilians, ambushing vehicles and trains, looting and burning to the ground entire villages and small towns and sowing landmines on a massive scale in the rural countryside.
The substantive agenda of the peace talks circumvented these issues in the interest of negative peace. During the nego- tiations, the mediators were too weary to address such issues. No provisions were made for these problems after the peace process was completed. The second aspect related to the substantive agenda concerns the political economy of peace itself. Peace was in the interest of both parties to the con- flict.
Nevertheless, it had to be sold to them. As far as the government was concerned, peace was intimately linked to the prospect of a steady flow of development aid. Donors had made it clear to the government of Mozambique as early as that aid would only be forthcoming if the coun- try could move towards peace. The Nkomati Accord was a preliminary that was soon to be followed by economic liberalisation and later political opening. Peace held out the promise of a state in control of the flow of development resources. FRELIMOs adamant refusal to form a government of national unity after narrowly winning the first multiparty elections in effectively allowed it to reap the benefits of peace in the form of control over develop- ment aid.
As for the rebels, it is clear that peace meant much more than just an end to fighting. Within the framework of the cease-fire, a UN Trust Fund was set up in to aid political parties in the initial stages of democracy. Illiterate military leaders were integrated into the new national army as high-ranking officers. Leading RENAMO mem- bers found themselves sitting on commissions and institutions that placed them in a position to fend for themselves and their followers. The major prize, however, went to the leadership in the form of control over the resources flowing to the organisation as part of the peace deal.
Conclusion: The rebels who did not lose the war, but lost the peace The Rome peace negotiations brought a bitter and brutal war to an end. While it is perfectly legitimate to see them as an example of a very successful peace negotiation, caution should be exercised. They were able to bring peace about because they recognised the reality of violent armed conflicts. While basic political issues are important, more down to earth considerations have to be taken into account if peace negotiations are to be successful.
Politics were central to the Mozambican conflict. The idea that the conflict was about democracy or the return of the country to its own cultural traditions was a usable one, both for the warring parties as well as for interested observers. It served the purpose of giving coherence to efforts to making it solvable. However, the main thrust of the negotiation process did not consist in lay- ing the ground for democracy to work.
Rather, it consisted in winning the war- ring parties over to the cause of peace. The main bait used by the international mediators to lure the warring parties into negotiations was the promise of development aid to be channelled through a democratic and peaceful Mozambican state. In this, however, there lay a dilemma that casts its shadow over the post-conflict order.
Peace negotiations aimed at bringing about nega- tive peace and in order to do so they had to gloss over basic human rights issues such as the atrocities that were committed during the war, the destruction of property and the general arrested development of the country. The basic assumption underlying the outcome of the Rome negotiations is that there were neither winners nor losers. Since the biggest prize was the development state, by winning the first general elections in and surviving through the transitional stage to the second general elections in , FRELIMO was able to keep the state firmly under its control and dictate the terms of the post- conflict order.
Fiere again the Rome negotia- tions can be regarded as having played a significant role. Indeed, as part of the peace deal, the RENAMO leadership was placed in a neo-patrimonial posi- tion with regards to its own constituency. The United Nations Trust Fund as well as the cash handouts paid to the leaders gave the latter considerable financial power, which they have used to entrench their position. Meanwhile, RENAMOs chief negotiator in Rome, Raul Domingos, has left the party for reasons related to accusations of finan- cial mismanagement rather than for political differences.
This might not be unrelated, once again, to the terms of the Rome peace agree- ment. Given that the major prize promised by the peace settlement was the state, RENAMO concentrated its energies on capturing it. In the process, the rebels neglected basic political work such as establishing structures at the local level. In this way, it might have missed a golden opportunity to estab- lish itself as a political force with political responsibilities within the context of local-level politics. Whether this indicates a sig- nificant departure from the obsession with state power remains to be seen.
The highly centralised nature of Mozambican politics has played a role in promoting state fixation.
In a context where all taxes are levied and distrib- uted by the central authorities, real political power can only be wielded by those who control the state. Its effective military campaign was a useful resource to win political accommodation in a post-conflict Mozambique, but the benefits of peace in the form of the development state went to the former enemy. All that RENAMO has been left with is the empty shell of a neo-patrimonial polit- ical organisation without enough funds to keep up the pretence.
The Rome peace agreement seems to have come to its limits. The next elections may be a very strong test of the Rome agreement. It seems that the post-war arrangement faces its major test. This warning is not only indicative of the deep mistrust that underlies Mozambican politics at the moment, but also reflects the terms of the Rome peace deal in a significant manner.
An impor- tant party to the peace deal is getting desperate, and this might not augur well for the future of peace in Mozambique. The few cases where civil wars were actually terminated were mainly due to the victory of one side e. As a result, the political leaders de facto had good chances for an amnesty and only the lower officer ranks and the rank and file risked criminal proceedings. It took place at a Lisbon Hotel and was a never-ending list of exe- cutions, assassinations and threats that took place in South Africa, Malawi and Portugal over the political leadership of Renamo and control of its funds [EM] see also Vines Albeit in 33 cities and towns.
London, Atlantic Highlands, N. Alden, Chris. Basingstoke: Palgrave. Austin, Kathi, and William Minter. Invisible Crimes: U. Private Intervention in the War in Mozambique. Cabrita, Joao M. Mozambique: the Tortuous Road to Democracy. New York: Palgrave. Chan, Stephen, and Moises Venancio. War and Peace in Mozambique. Chilcote, Ronald H. Emerging Nationalism in Portuguese Africa: Documents. Finnegan, William. A Complicated War: the Harrowing of Mozambique. Berkeley: U of California P. Geffray, Christian. Paris: Karthala; Credu.
Gersony, R. Washington: State Department. Hall, Margaret and Tom Young. Athens: Ohio UP. Hanlon, Joseph. Mozambique — Who Calls the Shots? London: James Currey. Oxford; Portsmouth, N. Currey; Heinemann. Hoile, David and Mozambique Institute. Mozambique, Resistance and Freedom: a Case for Reassessment. London: Mozambique Institute. Hume, Cameron. Magaia, Lina. Trenton, N. Minter, William.
Johannesburg; London; Atlantic Highlands, N. Neubert, Dieter. The role of NGOs in processes of peace- building in decentralised conflicts. Foblets and T. Oxford: Hart. Saul, John S. Recolonization and Resistance: Southern Africa in the s. Sift, Peter.
Alberton: Galago. Mozambique - UN Peacekeeping in Action United Nations. The United Nations and Mozambique, Zartman, William. Ripe for Resolution. Conflict and Intervention in Africa. He has written extensively on African political sociology, knowledge and development work. His most recent publications include: Neubert, Dieter, ed. Postkoloniale Transformation inAfrika.
Zur Neubestimmung der Soziologie der Dekolonisation. Supplement of the journal Sociologus. Non-Governmental Organisations in Africa. He has written on religion, work and disasters in Africa. His most recent pub- lications are: Macamo, Elisio, ed. Macamo, Elisio, ed. Entsetzliche soziale Prozesse — theoretische und empirische Anndherungen. Macamo, Elisio, and Dieter Neubert. Mozambique is widely promoted on the world stage as a success story. But what is the reality underlying this shining image of success and post- war reconstruction?
The article first presents the dominant portrayal of Mozambique, giving examples from various discursive sites official reports of international organizations, governmental documents, the media, etc. First, it describes the growing inequality that characterises Mozambican society today, the ever-growing wealth alongside widespread poverty and social exclusion in both urban and rural areas. It then considers the entrenched culture of corruption and violence that has arisen in the context of neo-liberal reform, exemplified most tragically in the assassination of journalist Carlos Cardoso in The analysis draws on various sources, including interviews conducted by the author in , official reports and documents, and the media.
The thought typical of any age has the primary function of hiding the realities of that age and perpetuating its evils. This is an image of peace, stability, democracy, reform, and growth, with a government that displays political will and commitment to poverty reduction.
The former one- party system has been reformed into a multi-party democracy, and a healthy civil society has emerged. This was clear first during the peace process of the early s, and more recently in the co-operative manner in which government policies are formed in consultation with the donor com- munity and private sector as well as local civil society.
Thus in the UK Department for International Development affirmed that good progress is being made. The Government of Mozambique is commit- ted to reducing poverty. The Government promotes a constructive and open relationship with the donors. The prospects for an effective development partnership with Mozambique are good. Britain should expect to be involved long-term. President, if there is one country in the world where the efforts of the United Nations — in peacemaking, peacekeeping and peace-building — have made an incontrovertible difference, I suggest that Mozambique would be that country.
This is seen in the recent establish- ment of the National Plan for the Reduction of Absolute Poverty , which was drawn up in consultation with Mozambican civil society and consists of a pol- icy framework through which to achieve a significant reduction in the level of absolute poverty over the next decade. Implemented by a government keen to cooperate with the private sector and woo foreign investment, those reforms have brought double-digit growth alongside single-digit inflation.
This discourse emerged in the post-war years of the twentieth century and has been re-invig- orated in recent years. It is also a growth with enormous wealth — but not the kind of wealth that pro- duces a rich society, only rich individuals. The gulf between the discursive and the concrete is matched only by the ever-growing gulf between rich and poor in Mozambique. The extremes of inequality are visi- ble and prominent; Mozambique has become a place of different worlds alongside each other.
This is evident along two dimensions: first in the dif- ference between the worlds of the city and the countryside; second in the growing contrast of wealth and poverty within the towns and cities. The majority of Mozambicans live in the countryside. They sell what they can — ground-nuts, maize, cassava, cotton, beans, perhaps some cashew nuts.
In their own words the people living in the countryside are camponeses or Mogambicanos. The liberalisation of mar- kets is assumed to liberate the rural producers, enabling them to respond to price incentives and increase their income: Price incentives, and therefore market liberalisation are important to rural poverty reduction. An appropriate incentive environment for agriculture through the full liber- alisation of agricultural markets [ Each one decides how many machambas to plant each year. It is not controlled by anyone. And we manage to produce.
We produce a lot, but the problem is this. We go to sell our produce and receive money, but what we can buy — we can buy vir- tually nothing, it is only enough perhaps to buy a kapulana for our wife, and the husband has to remain as he is, with nothing, only at least giving some respect to his wife. So he is obliged to go along with that price. He cannot set the price, let us say, in relation to his own blood, the work of his own blood. And so it is him that can establish the price. But these days — this does not happen.
The prices are established elsewhere, and so the traders arrive here, and buy, and the campones has nothing to do, is not able to complain. So in fact we are obliged to sell at whatever price. Whether we like it or not, we have to sell at whatever price. In terms of the prices of the traders, it is very low, in relation to the things we need to buy from the shops. So for someone to buy a bar of soap, for example, which costs 10,M, you have to take a lot of produce, because when you take one kilo it is not enough to buy a bar of soap.
Because the price of a kilo of ground-nut is very low, so you have to take many kilos of ground-nut in order to be able to buy just one bar of soap. And then what about clothes for your wife, clothes for the children, you have to take so much produce. This is our difficulty, here in the countryside. There is no balance between the money and the goods. Someone can sell their ground-nut for 4,M a kilo. Then there will come a time — after the ground-nut is over — the same traders come wanting to buy for 5,M, 6,M.
But after it is over! In towns and cities many Mozambicans live in the bairros surrounding the centre. For those lucky enough to have a regular job in the manufacturing or service sector the wages are generally pitifully low. The problem for the ordinary Mozambican during this post-war period, in urban areas as in the countryside, is how to live, how to get by: The life of the people [ There were no clothes, there was nothing; when this war — when Mozambicans were fighting each other — stopped, in this period now, now there are clothes, in the shops.
But even so, life has become difficult. It is a lack of employment. So — it becomes very difficult: how a person can get by, work things out resolver a vida. There are many there, sitting, who have nothing to do. How to get by, throughout the year, is very difficult. Especially here in Nampula. Here in Nampula things are really bad. Even if you have a lot, see? These days, the main difficulty is that each person struggles in order to have things.
This is what is most difficult — how to have. These days this is the prob- lem, this is the issue. The dif- ficulty of life these days is this. Each person is struggling to have things. But it is not easy to have things these days. Now none of these factories are functioning, as a result first of the war and then as a result of the post-war liberalization. Then it became Angocaju. I worked all the years, from Nacala to here, for twenty-five years. I even became a mechanic. Second former cashew factory employee: I began to work in Here, in Angoche, when it was Caju de Mozambique.
Later I became a security guard. And then I was made redundant — let us say — with nothing. Now, as the factory has stopped working, some are really suffering, they have no means of livelihood. A mechanic!! And so because of this there is no good life. First: Because of this things are bad. I live with nine people at home. I have five children. Second: There are many people who have their families to look after. I have six children. And so people go to fish, they can fish, but there is no one to buy the fish, because no one has money. There were at least three factories functioning, or two [ It is not normal.
There were around 1, people working at the factory — in the beginning, around , it was 4,, but lately only 1 , Now all these people are left with nothing. They go around with empty hands. Second: Things are miserable, because we have to rely on fishing. Artisanal fishing, small scale — not industrialised, mechanised, like Angopeixe [The former fish-pro- cessing plant]. And so this fishing — truly people cannot manage. As you can see — [pointing to the mechanic].
It is like this for most people. This is how things are. So where is the evidence of the much-lauded double-digit economic growth? It is not in the factories, which lie silent with locked gates, leaving workers unemployed and empty-handed. Is it perhaps in the shining new shops, cafes and restaurants blossoming in the cities? In the shining new Mercedes automobiles, the 4x4 Pajeros and Isuzos parading the pot-holed streets of the city centres? In the space of a few months in , two huge new shops opened in Nampula, with enormous glass shop-fronts and marble facing, selling a daunting array of household goods and equipment, tools, and mechanical parts.
At the same time a new ice-cream parlour opened, which would have looked at home in any smart European or North American high-street. The vendadores da rua watch from the darkness as 4x4s drive up and well-dressed passengers descend to enjoy an evening ice-cream. Who is it that fills up their brand new Nissan Patrols in the smart BP fore-court? And where does the money come from? In Maputo the same processes take place but on a larger and faster scale — more hotels, more supermarkets, bigger shopping centres, appearing almost overnight.
Their marble and glass facades shine in the sun while, across the pot-holed road, piles of rotting, stinking litter overflow from the old metal bins all over the cracked, broken pavements. Clearly there are some very wealthy people in Mozambique. But what is the source of their wealth? It does not seem to come from production in Mozambique. Mozambican soci- ety includes within it some exceedingly wealthy people; but it is not a wealthy society. But rich without wealth. In truth, it would be better to call them not rich but well-off.
The rich are those who possess means of production. A rich person is one who generates money and provides employment. A well-off person is simply one who owns money. Or who thinks he does. Because, in truth, it is money who owns the person. What they have, they do not keep.
Even worse: what they exhibit as theirs, is the prop- erty of others. It is the produce of robbing and shady deals. They cannot, how- ever, these well-off people of ours, relax and enjoy the benefits of all that they have robbed. They live obsessed by the fear that they could be robbed. The biggest dream of our new-rich is, in the end, very small: a luxury car, some ephemeral cintildncias. But the luxury vehicles are not able to dream very much, jolted by the pot-holes in the streets.
The Mercedes or the BMW cannot fully real- ize their brilliance, occupied as they are with navigating between bulging chapas and pitted roads. The existence of good roads is dependent on a different sort of wealth. A wealth that serves the city. And the wealth of our new-rich was born from the opposite process: the impoverishment of the city and of society. The political economy of double-digit growth: the growth of wealth and corruption In pursuit of economic growth, since the mid to late s the government of Mozambique has embarked on a programme of structural adjustment and liberalisation.
This has included currency devaluation; one of the most exten- sive and rapid programmes of privatisation in Africa; 23 liberalisation of the market internally and externally through the removal of fixed prices and state-controlled marketing institutions and the removal of import and export tariffs; reform of the tax system and property laws to create an environment attractive for private business and, above all, foreign investment. These include large-scale financial fraud, drug trafficking, money laundering, smuggling, and other forms of organised illegal activity. It is these forms of accumulation that help to account for some of the visible manifestations of extreme wealth alongside growing poverty and insecurity outlined above, which over the past decade have come to be a definitive condition of Mozambican society.
Over the past five years or so, increasing evidence has emerged that prac- tices of fraud, organised crime and corruption have become embedded within Mozambican society at a high level. As public criticism and attention mounted so too did a culture of violence and a routine disregard for justice and public integrity, on the part of many economic and political actors.
This tragic murder was only one part of an ongoing struggle between social forces in Mozambican society that has grown up in the con- text of neo-liberal reform. This is a struggle between those seeking to further the collective interests of Mozambican society and those seeking to pursue personal gain with no regard for collective social costs. And all this has been brought about under the guise of precisely the seductive, technocratic discourse of economic growth and prosperity examined above.
The rapid and widespread programme of privatisation, initiated in the mids, enabled foreign investors and members of the Mozambican elite to acquire assets easily and cheaply, with easy access to credit lent to the gov- ernment by international economic institutions but disbursed by commercial banks. Formal investigation into the bank fraud was slow and ineffective. It transpired that the process had been deliberately delayed and disorganised by members of the Public Prosecution Office, apparently acting to protect the suspects by preventing the case from proceeding and destroying key evidence from the case file.
Networks of criminals are involved in sig- nificant levels of drug trafficking, money laundering, trade in stolen cars, and other forms of illegal trade, which are made possible by protection or coop- eration from police and customs officials, who are bought through bribes. The profits of the Mozambicans involved in the trafficking amount to mil- lions of US dollars each year. Some of this money is spent on items such as houses and luxury cars, but the traffickers also convert large portions of their proceeds into properties and businesses in the legitimate economy to generate profits or to sell at a later stage without arousing suspicion.
It is suspected that this money has contributed to the upsurge in the construction of new buildings in Maputo, Nampula and Pemba. The investment in hotels and tourism is strategic because it is relatively easy to declare more clients than have actually been serviced and thereby disguise profits earned from illicit drug trafficking 9. Most Mozambicans do not have ready access to clean drink- ing water and must walk for over an hour to reach the nearest health unit.
On the contrary, it is the normal outcome of neo-liberal reform that is entirely abstracted from the concrete concerns and needs of human societies and con- cerned only about the growth of international capital. What matters in the current global development era is not the satisfaction of human needs but the satisfaction of international credit ratings. Notes 1 This article draws on research that was funded by the UK Economic and Social Research Council grant numbers R and T and additional support from the University of Sussex, which is gratefully acknowledged.
I thank the following for their various support and discussions which helped in writing this article: Gabrielle Anthmer, Dulce Bastos, Soila Hirvonen, Peki, Phillip Rothwell, Julian Saurin, Carlos Serra, and all those who facilitated my research in Mozambique. Last year GDP grew by We are very proud of our accomplishments in Mozambique. The job creation, the ability to successfully attract new foreign investment, and the ability to sustain real double-digit economic growth has consistently earned Mozambique a place among the top economic performers.
GDP growth for was approxi- mately 1 0 percent, and has averaged in double digits during the past three years. Mozambique becomes the third country to reach this point after Bolivia and Uganda. The result is an effective connection between nations, consumers, vendors, and investors. The minimum wage was enough to buy only Workers of many companies have been unpaid for months.
Interview with empregados, Nampula city, 18 June While the newspaper broke with the military, it remained in a privileged position, despite being censored for years. As director and owner of the newspaper, Ruy Mesquita helped me when I was arrested. I received orders to present myself in court and Ruy, together with the President of the Union of Journalists at the time, Audalio Dantas, and my wife at the time, Olinda all spoke in my defence.
So I will tell you that from this moment my paper considers you personally responsible for what happens to him. I had to stay a week and respond to interrogation, I was asked to write an entire history detailing my level of involvement and militancy within the party, but nothing happened to me, thanks to Ruy. This case of Vladimir Herzog still shocks people as his killers took such acts as to put him on the gallows to make it appear that he had committed suicide when if fact he was already dead. What the photos do not show is that witnesses said his feet were touching the ground.
The photographers were members of the Army, and so omitting this was a manipulation of image and just part of their job. Though many saw through the image, it is possible to see that he was placed in a simulated position. The most trouble fact was that Vladimir was not a communist.
We all were, but not Vlado, and this is the great irony of his fate. He was chief of the news programme of TV Cultura and was accused of spread communism through his work in the media. What about your fellow communists, what happened to them? The military used terror with physical and psychological fear to break people down. Were you accused of being subversive? I was accused and later considered subversive because at the time, there was a process in military justice that you were of interest as a suspect for two years.
At my trial, I was accused of belonging to the Communist Party, to develop subversive activities and threats to the regime and the established government, under the National Security Act. The death penalty was stipulated for subversives who were convicted. This was the only time in the history of Brazil in which the death penalty had been established by law, and not against dangerous criminals, but against the political elements who opposed to the regime or thought differently to the system.
Despite this legislation, there was not a single recorded case of a conviction resulting in a legally registered execution. These acts were not those of the military exercising their legitimate power. It was criminal, and the military acted illegally. But still, Brazil seems to lack a clear and rounded political spectrum. Do you agree that there is a lack of an ideology? I agree. The recent protests only identified in widespread popular dissatisfaction with the system of government, the regime, with the gap between politicians and the people, but there is no clear direction of how to fix it.
There is no ideological line or thinking to justify this popular dissatisfaction. This thinking unifies the heads of the military, judges, lawyers who can form a core and once again propose a decisive dictatorial regime in the country. This worries me a bit, despite finding it difficult to see how a new dictatorship would be allowed to form, because the increasing global media makes social problems visible. When you consider what is happening in the Arab world, for example, against the dictators, it seems that the international climate is beneficial to a democratic way. Today we have an outbreak of political movements, though none have been based on a defined ideology, so it is hard to analyse.
Today, as editorialist of O Estado de S. Paulo, you have moved very far from your communist background to write for a conservative readership. How was this change for you? I do not believe that you do not retain part of that leftist vision in your heart I keep this in some ways. But I realised, or rather, I recognised the big mistakes in the leftist fights, not only in Brazil but also worldwide in the last 50 years in journalism.
During this period as a journalist, I had to acknowledge the many mistakes made by the left, and the concrete fact that the left failed to produce a scheme to solve everyday problems of the popular economy. The positive side to the left was to hold capitalism to account. Existing without opposition, without resistance, is actually a system that deploys social cruelty.
With the end of communist parties and organised resistance to capitalism, this sparked a revival of capitalist abuses that are now appearing. The fact that opposition no longer exists in an organised manner is bringing a disorganised resistance. Namely, the wave of worldwide protests, including those in the Arab world, which encapsulate violent forms of resistance against the abuses of capitalism and governance. The ideal scenario would be the appearance of organised forms of struggle.
Once these shapes have ceased to exist, any other, less tested formula becomes influential. How can they be saved? By Alec Heron. Researchers have come into contact with seven members of a previously undiscovered indigenous community, in the state of Acre, northern Brazil. The group of seven; five male and two female between the ages of 12 and 21, are believed to be part of a larger community that recently crossed the border from Peru to Brazil, fleeing the violent attacks of loggers and drugs traffickers.
Many are losing their land to the violent advances of illegal loggers and drug traffickers harnessing routes through the dense forest for the shipment of their cargo. Illegal logging has long been a problem in these areas and oil and gas exploration is now pushing into remote areas, particularly in Peru. Growing drug trafficking activity across the Peru-Brazil border may also be driving isolated tribes out of the forest. Guard posts in the area of the new contact were closed after being ransacked by suspect drug traffickers in , and were reopened only last June, when the isolated Indians took the initiative to establish the first contact.
The last time an isolated tribe was discovered in Brazil was in , when FUNAI searched for and contacted the Korubo community in Amazonas state, to warn. In , an isolated community in Acre was filmed from the air by BBC cameras working with FUNAI in a bid to raise awareness that isolated communities did exist in the area and were in need of government policies.
On June 29, the two groups met and exchanged gifts before three of the isolated group - young men wearing no clothing - began to remove items from the camp at which the research team had been based since June 13, putting themselves at risk of contamination from outside viruses their immune systems are not equipped to fight.
The isolated indigenous group reappeared later in the afternoon, but were stopped by the researchers from entering the camp. The natives returned the following day, June 30, already showing signs of flu. On July 4, they returned once more and were given medicine before leaving the research group. Eventually, all seven of the isolated group were taken to a medical base on July 6 alongside the research team, where they received medical treatment until July 11, before returning to the rest of their group. Alice Bayer of Survival International, a London-based NGO that works to protect indigenous communities worldwide, says that the risks posed to the isolated indigenous communities of South America are critical and come in the form of both.
An epidemic would be devastating. FUNAI states that in principal, contact is only made when it is clear the isolated community members wish to make contact. The former head of FUNAI, Sydney Possuelo, knows this from first-hand experience as a sertanista — whose job it was in the s and s to make first contact with remote communities in the Amazon. Everything, everything, plays against them. They become so subordinate to us, for we break up their education, their health, their means of work, their mythical system. They become outcasts. For how long? Well, some of them have been outcasts for years.
Please name to me a single tribe. Contact with seven members of a previously undiscovered indigenous community in the state of Acre red. If we do nothing now, if the Brazilian state does not move quickly and really begin understand that these people deserve to live, the Brazilian state will be leaving them to die.
The project establishes the revitalisation of the protection bases and the creation of two new bases in the area. It also educational and awareness projects of the surrounding communities, to ensure the protection and rights of those people who, of their own volition, decide to remain in voluntary isolation. The group of seven two pictured , five male and two female between the ages of 12 and 21, are believed to be part of a larger community that recently crossed from Peru to Brazil.
When assimilated into modern society, many tribes miss their former nomadic life. As a result of land losses, unscrupulous exploitation of their resources and stark differences in culture and behaviour to others in society, they face conflict, psychological problems and prejudice. They live in another world, another time. They have committed to protecting from where these peoples have come from. But as we can tell, obviously not very effectively. They are asking us to carry out our. This is why we are here. The others do not treat us well. People speak well of you. We are accustomed to fighting with other people.
You can kill one of us, but you will also die. How is life there? How is life? There are several more tribes across the border in Peru. Brazil is home to more uncontacted communities than any other country, with the western Brazilian Amazon home to the highest concentration in the world. Isolated indigenous are the most vulnerable people on the planet. Many of their lands, on which they depend for their survival, are being invaded and contact with outsiders could be fatal, as they have very little immunity to outside diseases. From to the s the numbers of indigenous people in Brazil declined sharply.
Many communities became extinct, killed by foreign diseases or enslaved and murdered by the colonising arrivals from Spain and Portugal. The disappearance of indigenous peoples was for a long time seen as inevitable. However, this picture began to show signs of change in the last decades of the 20th century. The growth rate was nearly six times higher than the general population. The largest concentration of indigenous peoples in Brazil is in the northern states such Acre, Amazonas and Roraima, where in , lived. The second highest concentration of indigenous peoples in Brazil is the , living in the northeastern states Alagoas, Pernambuco, Ceara, etc.
Uncontacted communities are aware of the existence of outsiders, including neighbouring isolated and contacted communities. There is often some form of interaction with neighbouring communities, for example, sometimes uncontacted peoples approach settled villages and take pots, pans and machetes. The group encountered on 29 June in Acre were in possession of a gun they had retrieved from a logger or narcotraffickers camp elsewhere in the rainforest. OPPOSITES In the first report of the series that will profile the five presidential candidates best positioned in the polls for the October election, the Brasil Observer begins with the fourth and fifth placed, respectively Pastor Everaldo and Luciano Genro, who have little in common in their agendas and proposals for government.
On one side, an evangelical pastor leader of the Assembly of God church whose purpose of candidature, by the Social Christian Party PSC , is to defend the principles of family, openly oppose the decriminalization of abortion and homosexual civil unions, and advocate the reduction of criminal responsibility to 16 years. On the other, a former student activist who was elected to National Congress by the Workers Party PT , from where she was expelled a year later and found the Socialism and Liberty Party PSOL — left-wing opposition - whose proposed policy is based on the citizen audit of public debt and a comprehensive reform of the tax system, including taxation of large fortunes, decriminalization of marijuana, the legalization of abortion and the guarantee of LGBT rights.
Everaldo Dias Pereira and Luciana Krebs Genro, best known only by Pastor Everaldo and Luciana Genro, have virtually nothing in common, except the remote chance of reaching at least the double-digit mark in the race for the presidency, on the 5th of October. Either way, both candidates should enjoy greater exposure during the campaign to impose some of their flags in the debate among the favourites.
In , for example, the legalization of abortion was much debated, although not in the best possible way, I. Dilma escaped the trap and won the election, but did not advance the debate so as not to offend a portion of the electorate that has grown considerably in recent years.
Evangelicals of various denominations reach a total of It is the fastest growing religion in the country, at the expense of a slow but steady decline of Catholicism. The followers of the Church of Rome fell from If the trend is maintained, protestants may represent a third of Brazilians in the next decade.
Proof of the importance given by the presidential campaigns to the evangelical community. The main focus of evangelicals, however, remains in the legislative. Never has so many candidates been pastors in elections. As a comparison, only 16 Catholic priests are candidates across the country. Currently, there are 73 congressmen, according to the Inter-Parliamentary Advisory Department. In this scenario, it is up to Luciana Genro to pull the debate to a leftist leaning. Since the arrival of the PT to the federal government, and the consequent centralization of the party in the name of governance gained in Congress thanks to alliances with former political rivals, the PSOL are mainly intended for the historical flags of that party that many of its members also helped to found in the s.
One of them, for example, is for a democratic media law that would end the monopoly of the media today in the country. With ten years down the road, the PSOL has gained momentum since the demonstrations of June last year thanks to a noisy militancy. You cannot, however, observe a real party unity. Some of the main leaders of the party did not attend the launch of the application of Luciana Genro, as deputies Jean Wyllys, Ivan Valente and Chico Alencar.
Pastor Everaldo and Luciana Genro therefore are located at opposite ends of the Brazilian political-ideological spectrum. Among them are the candidates of the order, those who lead the intentions of votes and whose programmatic differences are smaller and harder to be noticed. Everaldo Dias Pereira, 58, is married to gospel singer Ester Batista and has three children. Everaldo was born in the poor neighbourhood of Acari in the northern zone in Rio de Janeiro, the son of a minister father and a missionary mother.
He worked as a street vendor, construction builder and office junior in an insurance brokerage. He graduated in actuarial science from the Faculty of Economy and Finance in the State of Rio de Janeiro and opened his own brokerage. There nursed the Citizen Cheque, a program of income distribution. In he was one of the coordinators of the campaign for the presidency of Garotinho. He first became involved with politics in the first direct elections for state governor in , when he served as campaign manager for Brizola, which won the bid.
In , he supported Lula for the presidency. He occupies the position of national vice-president of the Social Christian Party His definitive entry into politics was in PSC , the party which he joined in On the One of his sons, Filipe de Almeida Pereira, recommendation of the then deputy gover- is a congressman by the party. Due to kinship, she was prevented by the courts to participate in the electoral process in She is granddaughter of Adelmo Genro, who was impeached by the dictatorship when she was deputy mayor of Santa Maria. At 14, she started his political career in the student movement.
Then entered the Socialist Convergence, group of PT. All opposed the welfare reform proposed by President Lula. The following year, was re-elected federal deputy for Rio Grande do Sul. During its passage by the House, Luciana could approve the Committee on Constitution and Justice House bill regulating taxes on large fortunes. The Constitution created this tax, but because there is no regulation, he was never charged. In , Luciana ran for mayor of Porto Alegre and finished fourth in the election.
Two years later disputed charge for Congresswoman of Rio Grande do Sul, but could not get re-elected, even winning At 23, Luciana was elected state deputy the eighth largest in the state vote. In the same year, joined for the PT. It is daily struggle that makes every Flip a worthwhile experience for the momentary acknowledgements of recognition, and the chance to connect with readers.
It was his tenth Flip as an author and his books sell well. He is well known so does not need to stop people , they come to him. He told me that this time he had came from Campina Grande on a motorcycle, stopping in 72 cities to deliver his books to public schools. At just 19 Lisandra Almeida, is a young writing debutante. She attended to try and reach young with her suspenseful novel, written when she was just Fitting when I tell you that the subject of my book was insignificance.
But insignificance is the essence of existence, as Milan Kundera teaches us. Flip is one a huge party. With the ambition of democratisation of literature, the latest edition was projected on big the screens with free transmission. For the first time the round table discussions that take place in the tents were transmitted to all those to enjoy in the sun. But as always, in addition to the official tables, populated by an amalgamation of world-renowned authors, fans and first-timers, there is a big party that follows its own schedule during the festival.
Messy and irreverent, the city enchants you as you stumble across the stones of the historic centre. Each year two Flips take place and this was the year that I attended for the first time as an author to both of them. With a newly published book, I felt myself searching for model readers and others to share the experience on the streets of Paraty.
So what for my contribution to the event? I decided to enter the house tent of the newspaper Folha de S. Paulo, which was one of the most crowded. My book, which is an analysis of the same newspaper during the military dictatorship in Brazil, stayed in my bag. Then having found a space, I took my chance to deposit my own book on the shelf. An insignificant action but now that put a bastard smile on the face of this little author.
It will have a reader, but who that is I will never know. In October, the second edition of FlipSide, the English edition of the festival will be taking place, tickets and information can be found at www. You can be involved too, just send your story to us! Find out how to get involved by contacting conectando brasilobserver.
But a new book by Ishmahil Blagrove Jr reveals that the greatest debt is owed to one remarkable woman. The story of the Notting Hill Carnival began on the backstreets of North Kensington in a community scarred by poverty and racial tension. Those living in the area had to endure overcrowding inside dilapidated accommodation with no bathrooms, hot water and, as late as the sixties, no electricity.
Two World Wars within thirty years had left the UK with a desperate labour shortage and so the Empire turned towards its colonies for help and invited mass immigration to Britain. West Indians arrived in droves, joining the working-class Britons, Jews, Irish, Greeks and Spaniards who were already living in the cramped tenements of Notting Hill. By the late s, Notting Hill and Brixton had the most concentrated population of West Indians in the country. West Indians were accused of taking their jobs, their homes, their women, and of playing loud music until the early hours.
The Notting Hill Race Riots of , and the racist murder of Antiguan carpenter Kelso Cochrane the following year, brought the tensions to a climax. These events became the catalyst through which activists mobilised in an effort to bridge cultural gaps. The British Communist Party led protest marches throughout the area. Meanwhile, Claudia Jones, a Brixton-based Trinidadian political activist and editor of the first black weekly newspaper in Britain, the West Indian Gazette, presented the idea of holding a Caribbean carnival to build unity by showcasing Caribbean culture.
Jones was a talented and determined woman who fought tirelessly for the human rights of oppressed peoples around the world. A resident in the US since emigrating with her parents from Trinidad, aged nine, she was jailed four times for her activism and membership of the Communist Party, and eventually expelled from America in It was held indoors because it had been planned to coincide with the Trinidadian celebration traditionally held between January and March, but the English weather proved too cold for the event to be hosted outdoors.
Jones is often credited with having brought the celebration of Caribbean carnival culture. However credit is also due to many others, among them the Trinidadian husband-and-wife team of Pearl and Edric Connor, who were the booking agents for the artists and organised many of the events. The West Indian Gazette organised other indoor Caribbean Carnival cabarets that were performed at various London venues, including Seymour Hall, Porchester Hall and the Lyceum Ballroom, and continued until , when Jones died prematurely from heart disease at the age of Laslett set up an adventure playground for children called Shanty Town and established a voluntary neighbourhood service that provided free hour legal advice to immigrants, local residents and the homeless.
Laslett consulted her trusted neighbour and respected figure in the community, Guyanese activist Andre Shervington, about how to get the West Indian community to participate in the festival. She also consulted others and was advised to invite a well-known Trinidadian musician named Russell Henderson whose Sunday afternoon jazz gig on Old Brompton Road was popular among West Indians. It was the attendance of his band that changed the course of what might otherwise have become a traditional English pageant, albeit with a multicultural theme.
Horse-drawn carts were borrowed from traders in Portobello Road to make floats and there was even an inter-pub darts match. Henderson had inadvertently put a Caribbean hallmark on the festival and word quickly spread to the other West Indian communities in England about what had taken place. In successive years, although the carnival was still diverse and eclectic and ran as a week-long Notting Hill Festival, it became progressively more West Indian, and specifically Trinidadian, in flavour.
More and more steel-pan players, performers and West Indians joined in, and the street celebration came to eclipse events at a variety of indoor venues. The festival also began to take on more militant connotations in response to the pressures that black people and the counter-culture scene were experiencing at the hands of the police. The Black Power movement had spread across the Atlantic and gripped the imagination of the masses. It became increasingly uncomfortable to have a woman identified as white sitting at the helm of what was by now seen as a distinctly black Caribbean cultural affair.
She retired from organising the festival in due to ill health. She left, dismayed that the festival she had conceived had adopted a confrontational tone that had sidelined her contributions. And the contributions of Laslett and the London Free School have become cursory footnotes, thus perpetuating the belief that the Notting Hill Carnival is of uniquely black-Caribbean origin. O carnaval deste ano ocorre dias 24 e 25 de agosto thenottinghillcarnival. Enquanto isso, Claudia Jones, ativista nascida em Trinidade e Tobago, mas baseada em Brixton, que era editora do primeiro jornal semanal de cultura negra do Reino Unido, o West Indian Gazette, apresentou a ideia de realizar um carnaval caribenho para construir uma unidade entre as pessoas pela cultura.
Jones foi uma mulher talentosa e determinada que lutou incansavelmente pelos direitos humanos ao redor do mundo. Quando o grupo de Henderson chegou, os caribenhos tomaram as ruas. Henderson acabou, assim, colocando uma marca caribenha no festival, o que logo se espalhou entre todas as outras comunidades caribenhas da Inglaterra.